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When Better is Worse: 
Envy and the Use of Deception in Negotiations  
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we describe the influence of envy on the use of deception. We find that individuals 
who envy a counterpart are more likely to deceive them than are individuals who do not envy 
their counterpart. Across both a scenario and a laboratory study, we explore the influence of envy 
in a negotiation setting. Negotiations represent a domain in which social comparisons are 
prevalent and deception poses a particularly important concern. In our studies, we induce envy by 
providing participants with upward social comparison information. We find that upward social 
comparisons predictably trigger envy, and that envy promotes deception by increasing perceived 
gains and decreasing psychological costs of engaging in deceptive behavior. We discuss 
implications of our results with respect to impression management and emotional intelligence as 
well as the role of emotions in ethical decision making and negotiations.   
 
 
 
Keywords: deception, envy, negotiations, emotions, social comparison, ethics 
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Recent research has made important strides in understanding an important, but often 
neglected emotion, envy. Although envy is a self-sanctioned emotion that is not often vocalized, it 
is frequently a strong emotional reaction to an unfavorable social comparison and prior work has 
found that envy can exert substantial influence on interpersonal attitudes and behavior (e.g., 
Feather, 1989, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Smith, 1991; Smith et al., 
1994; Smith et al.,1996; Smith et al., 1999; Tesser & Collins, 1988; Vecchio, 1995, 2000).  
Surprisingly little research has considered the role of envy in organizational settings (see 
Mouly & Sunkaran, 2002; Vecchio, 1995, 2000 for exceptions). We postulate that envy is likely 
to play a particularly important role in organizations that both induce envy by promoting social 
comparisons (e.g., via performance reviews or promotion decisions) and require coordination 
among employees. In the present research, we consider an organizational domain in which envy is 
particularly likely to be triggered and in which envy is likely to have profound consequences, 
negotiations. Specifically, we explore the influence of envy in motivating a negotiator’s use of 
deception.   
ENVY 
Envy is defined as “the feelings that arouse when one person desires to have something 
that another person possesses" (Silver and Sabini, 1978. p. 107). Envy is often evoked when 
individuals are outperformed in a domain relevant to their self-concept, and prior work has found 
that envy is often associated with feelings of inferiority, frustration, subjective injustice, and 
longing (Parrott & Smith, 1993). In general, feelings of envy are more intense when the 
outperformer is someone similar to the target individual and when the outperformed person has 
suffered a setback (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser & Collins, 1988; Heider, 1958; Smith et al., 
1996; Smith et al., 1999).  
A number of studies suggest that envy may have important negative interpersonal 
consequences. Prior work has shown envy to shift attitudes and feelings toward the envied person 
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in several ways. People experiencing envy tend to devalue and belittle the envied target (Salovey 
& Rodin, 1984; Vecchio, 1995). For example, Salovey and Rodin (1984) found that participants 
rate students whom they envy lower than other students on traits such as caring, niceness, and 
attractiveness. Envy has also been associated with feelings of hostility (Smith, Parrott, Ozer & 
Moniz, 1994) and with schadenfreude (taking pleasure in the suffering of others; Smith et al., 
1996; Brigham, Kelso, Jackson & Smith, 1997). These findings are consistent with the “tall 
poppy” syndrome documented by Feather (1989, 1991) in Australian culture. This syndrome 
describes the tendency of individuals to hold negative attitudes toward successful others (“tall 
poppies”), and to favor their fall. Envy has been shown to have an impact not only on attitudes 
and feelings but also on behavioral tendencies and choices in interpersonal contexts. For example, 
envy has been associated with lower cooperation rates in social dilemmas (Parks, Rumble & 
Posey, 2002) and with increased social loafing and lower levels of group performance (Duffy and 
Shaw, 2000). In the present work, we extend this line of research by exploring the role of envy in 
promoting deception. We focus on negotiations, a domain where social comparisons are prevalent 
and deception possesses a particularly important concern.  
 
ENVY AND NEGOTIATIONS 
Negotiations are common social interactions frequently used by people to resolve 
differences and allocate resources. Negotiations occur at many levels, between buyers and sellers, 
politicians and diplomats, spouses, friends, colleagues, etc. (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).  
Prior work has demonstrated that social comparisons are common within negotiations 
(Connolly & Ordonez, 2000; Loewenstein, Thompson & Bazerman, 1989; Novemsky & 
Schweitzer, 2004). Since envy is triggered by social comparisons, we expect envy to be prevalent 
in negotiation settings. Although negotiators are likely to engage in social comparisons with their 
counterparts before, during, and after a negotiation, previous research has primarily focused on 
the influence of social comparisons with respect to outcomes after a negotiation has been 
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completed.  No prior work has considered how ex-ante comparisons might impact negotiator 
behavior. In this paper, we investigate this issue and describe the influence of envy produced by 
unfavorable pre-negotiation social comparisons on an important negotiator behavior, the use of 
deception.   
A growing body of negotiation research also explores the impact of affect in negotiations 
(for reviews see Thompson, Nadler & Kim, 1999; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore & Valley, 2000; 
Barry & Oliver, 1996). Much of this work has contrasted the influence of positive and negative 
moods. This work has found that individuals experiencing positive, rather than negative affect are 
more likely to engage in cooperative behavior, less likely to engage in contentious behavior, and 
more likely to create joint value (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Isen, Daubman & Nowicki, 1987; 
Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998; Murnighan, 1991). Related work has begun to focus on the influence 
of discrete emotions in negotiation, especially anger. This work has found that anger reduces joint 
gains, decreases the desire of negotiators to work together in the future, intensifies competitive 
behavior, and increases the rejection rate of offers (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). In some cases, however, the expression of negative emotions such 
as anger in negotiation can serve important communicative functions that benefit negotiators 
(Thompson et al., 1999; Frank 1988; Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 
2004a,b; Morris & Keltner, 2000). For example, Van Kleef et al., (2004a,b) demonstrate that 
expressing anger can elicit concessions from a counterpart.  
 Little negotiation research, however, has considered the influence of discrete emotions 
other than anger. As already noted, envy is one of the strongest emotions evoked by unfavorable 
social comparisons (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Smith et al., 1999; Tesser & Collins, 1988). Given 
the extant literature describing the important role that social comparisons play in interpersonal 
contexts such as negotiations (Connolly & Ordonez, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Novemsky 
& Schweitzer, 2004), the lack of prior work studying the role of envy in negotiations is surprising.  
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DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Deception represents a particularly important issue in negotiations (Lewicki, Barry, 
Saunders & Minton, 2003). Negotiations are characterized by information dependence; 
negotiators typically posses private information, which they need to share to reach an efficient 
agreement. In many cases, however, negotiators can misrepresent their private information to gain 
power and an opportunistic advantage (Lewicki et al., 2003; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 
2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999).  
Models of ethical decision making have largely neglected the role of emotion. Prior 
models have conceptualized ethical decision making as a product of economic incentives 
(Alingham & Sandmo, 1972; Holmstrom, 1979) or a mixture of incentives and cognitive factors 
(Jones, 1995; Jones & Ryan, 1997, 2001; Lewicki, Saunders & Minton, 1999; Lewicki, 1983; 
Lewicki et el., 2003; Trevino, 1986; Grover, 1993; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001, 2004; Gneezy, 
2004; Alingham & Sandmo, 1972; Schweitzer, Ordonez & Douma, 2004). For example, Lewicki 
(Lewicki, 1983; Lewicki et el., 2003) suggests that individuals make unethical decisions by 
weighing the perceived benefits and perceived costs of engaging in unethical acts.  
A few studies have considered emotional responses to unethical behavior. For example, 
Gaudine and Thorne (2001) suggest that emotional reactions may help decision makers identify 
ethical dilemmas, and in fact, research has found that emotional expressions do facilitate 
deception detection (e.g., Frank, 1988, 2002; Ekman, 2003; Buller & Burgoon, 1998; Frank & 
Ekman, 1997). Related work has considered the possibility that individuals might strategically 
misrepresent their emotions (Barry, 1999). This research, however, has not considered how 
emotions might operate as an antecedent of the decision to use deception. 
In the present work, we test the thesis that discrete feelings of envy increase the likelihood 
that an individual will engage in deception. Drawing upon previous findings we suggest that envy 
is likely promote deception by increasing the psychological gains and decreasing the 
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psychological costs of using deception when interacting with an envied counterpart. Congruent 
with the above mentioned research that has linked envy with schadenfreude (taking pleasure in 
the suffering of others; Smith et al., 1996, Feather, 1989, 1991), we postulate that feelings of envy 
may increase an individual's perceived psychological benefit from harming a counterpart via 
deception. Our notion that envy might lower the perceived psychological cost of engaging in 
deception is based on the previously described work that has found people experiencing envy to 
devalue and belittle the envied target (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Vecchio, 1995). We maintain that 
deceiving is likely to entail lower psychological costs and be easier to self justify if the person we 
deceive is devalued and belittled. To recapitulate this argument, envy that enhances belittling is 
expected to promote deception, since deceiving a belittled person may be easier to self-justify, 
and thereby entail lower psychological costs (Lewicki et al., 2003; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002).  
We conducted two studies to test the thesis that envy promotes deception. The first study 
employs scenario methods and explores the mechanics of the relationship between envy and 
deception. The second study examines actual behavior in a setting with monetary stakes.  
 
STUDY 1 
In this study, we examine the relationship between envy and intentions to engage in 
deception. We induce envy by describing different relative outcomes, and explore the mechanics 
of the relationship between envy and deception within a negotiation context. In particular, we 
describe the role of envy in promoting schadenfreude, thereby increasing psychological gains of 
deceiving, and in belittling the other person, thereby assisting self- justification and lowering the 
psychological costs of engaging in deception.  
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Method 
Design 
Participants completed one of four versions of a survey from a 2x2 between subject design 
which included two envy conditions (high or low) and two gender conditions (male or female). In 
both envy conditions, participants were asked to imagine a scenario at work in which they 
competed for and did not win a desired promotion. Participants were then asked to consider 
engaging in a negotiation with either the person who was awarded the promotion (high envy 
condition) or another person who was not awarded the promotion (low envy condition).  
Across conditions, we attempted to control for a number of factors. First, across 
conditions participants were asked to imagine being involved in a competition. Second, across 
conditions participants are asked to imagine losing. Third, across conditions we attempted to 
control for perceptions of procedural fairness. We described the company and its typical 
management decision making procedures in the following way: “You like the company, and 
believe that senior management goes to great lengths to make decisions carefully and fairly.” This 
was done to control for the possibility that subjective beliefs of injustice underlie the link between 
feelings of envy and deception (see Smith et al., 1994).  
Prior work has found that envy is experienced most acutely when individuals consider 
target others who are similar to themselves. Consequently, we matched the gender of the 
hypothetical counterpart with that of the respondent, so that male participants read a scenario 
about males and females about females. We further facilitated similarity beliefs by describing the 
participant and counterpart as having the same “career track”, with similar interests and goals for 
advancement in the company. 
Participants 
We recruited 164 participants to complete a survey in exchange for a chocolate bar. These 
participants included 47 working professionals and 115 MBA and Executive MBA students. A 
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majority of the participants (105) were female. On average, participants were 33 years old 
(sd=8.6), and had worked for 7.9 years (sd=8). Within each participant group and across both 
genders, we randomly assigned participants to one of the two envy conditions. Overall, 83 
participants completed the high envy version and 81 completed the low envy version.  
Procedure and Materials 
 In each condition, participants received a package of materials. The first part included the 
scenario describing the competition, its outcome, and the upcoming negotiation. The second part 
included an eight-item measure of deception. The third part measured envy. The fourth part 
measured perceived procedural fairness and assessed potential mediators of the relationship 
between envy and deception, including perceived psychological gains and psychological costs of 
engaging in deception. The final part solicited demographic information. 
Scenario 
Participants were asked to imagine competing with four co-workers for a desirable 
promotion. They were asked to imagine that after putting in long hours to increase their chance of 
earning the promotion, they learned from senior management that they were ranked second and 
were not selected. The promotion takes effect in one month, and before it takes effect, participants 
were told that they will need to work on a new company project with one of the co-workers with 
whom they competed for the promotion. This co-worker was either selected for the promotion 
(ranked first) or not selected for the promotion (ranked third). Participants were given details 
about the new project and told that as a first step, they “will need to negotiate the structure of this 
new project.” 
Deception measure  
Immediately after reading the scenario, participants completed an eight-item measure of 
unethical behavior that we adapted from the SINS scale (Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation 
Strategies; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). We chose and adapted items from the SINS 
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scale to match our negotiation context, and we list the items we used in Appendix 1. The scale 
reliability (Cronbach’s α) for the eight items was .83, and we used their mean as a combined 
measure for subsequent analysis. 
Envy measure  
 Our envy measure included four items. The first item directly asked participants to rate on 
a seven point scale the degree to which they felt envy toward their negotiating partner. The 
additional three items asked participants to rate the degree to which they agreed with the 
following statements about their negotiating partner:  “Her/his outcome (winning/not winning the 
promotion) has many advantages”; “I would have very much liked to get her/his outcome”; “The 
thought of her/his outcome makes me feel aggravated.” We computed the mean of these four 
items as our multi-item measure of envy (Cronbach’s α=.89) and report results with respect to 
this measure. (We conducted a separate set of analyses using the single item envy measure, and 
obtained the same pattern of results.) 
Potential Mediators  
 We also included questions to measure potential mediators of the relationship between 
envy and deception (we list the items in Appendix 2). These included: (a) five items for assessing 
belittling and self-justification of deception – i.e., psychological cost of deception, and (b) three 
items for assessing feelings of schadenfreude toward the other party – i.e., psychological gains of 
deception. The Cronbach’s α for the five psychological cost items is .66, and we used their mean 
score as an aggregate measure of perceived costs and justification. The three schadenfreude items 
measure potential psychological benefits of engaging in deception. The Cronbach’s α for these 
three items was only .45, but increased to .57 when we excluded the first item. Hence, we 
computed an aggregate mean schadenfreude measure without including the first item. 
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Procedural fairness 
We assessed perceived procedural fairness with two items.  The first referred to the 
specific current promotion decision: “I believe this promotion decision was made fairly.” and the 
second referred to the general company decision making procedures: “The procedures this 
company uses for making promotion decisions are typically unfair.”  (r=.31, p<.05).  
Demographic measures.  
We asked participants demographic questions about their age, gender, and years of work 
experience.  
Results 
 We first conducted a manipulation check. In an ANOVA testing envy ratings as a function 
of the envy condition and gender, the envy condition was significant (F1,160=478.95, p<.0001, 
η2=.75), but neither gender nor the interaction were significant (p’s >.5). That is, across both men 
and women, mean envy scores were significantly higher in the high envy condition, 5.60 
(sd=0.9), than they were in the low envy condition, 2.04 (sd=1.04).  
 Although envy can be exacerbated by perceptions of unfairness (Smith et al., 1994), we 
attempted to control for perceptions of fairness through our description of the company’s decision 
processes. We assessed the effectiveness of this control by examining participants’ responses to 
each of the two perceived procedural fairness items (one referred to the particular promotion 
decision, and the other to the company decisions in general) as a function of the experimental 
condition. Across conditions, none of these perceptions of procedural fairness were significantly 
different (t's<1, p’s>.3, for both items), suggesting that in manipulating envy we did not 
significantly influence perceptions of procedural fairness.  
 We next examined the tendency to engage in deception as a function of condition and 
gender. We conducted a factorial ANOVA with SINS score as the dependent variable and 
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condition (high or low envy) and gender (male or female) as independent variables. We depict 
these results in Figure 1. As expected, we find a significant main effect for condition (F1,160=5.53, 
p<.05, η2=.03); participants in the high envy condition claimed that they were more likely to 
engage in deception than were participants in the low envy condition . Consistent with previous 
findings (e.g., Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000), we also found 
a significant main effect for gender (F1,160=4.47, p<.05, η2=.03); males reported a greater 
willingness to engage in deception than did females. We did not, however, find a significant 
interaction between gender and condition (F1,160=.03, p=.85), suggesting that envy increased the 
self-reported likelihood that men and women would engage in deception by roughly the same 
amount. 
 We continued to examine our main thesis that envy enhances the likelihood of engaging in 
deception, and that this link is mediated by perceived psychological costs and benefits of 
deceiving. First, in Table 1, we present the raw correlations between the three independent 
variables: feelings of envy, psychological costs and psychological gains (schadenfreude). We 
continue to conduct mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to explore the relationships 
between feelings of envy, perceived psychological benefits and costs of deception, and intentions 
to use deception. Results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 2. As shown in the figure, we find 
that both psychological benefits (schadenfreude) and psychological costs shift as a function of 
envy and that these changes mediate the relationship between envy and deception. First, envy 
significantly affects schadenfreude as well as perceived psychological costs. Second, envy 
significantly affects intentions to engage in deception (absent other predictors). Third, a multiple 
regression for predicting the SINS score from envy in addition to schadenfreude and perceived 
costs reveals that both schadenfreude and perceived costs have a significant unique effect, and 
that when adding them to the model, the effect of envy decreases and becomes insignificant (see 
results of this multiple regression in Table 2, which also shows that collinearity is not a concern in 
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this study). This pattern of results implies that both perceived psychological costs and 
schadenfreude play a mediating role in the effect of envy on intended deception. We also 
conducted two separate Sobel tests for each mediator (Sobel, 1982). Results from the Sobel tests 
identify both perceived costs (z=2.85, p<.01) and schadenfreude (z=3.09, p<.01) as significant 
mediators. 1 
Study 1 Discussion 
We find that feelings of envy increase the self-reported likelihood of engaging in 
deception during a negotiation. While prior work has found that unfavorable relative outcomes 
can harm negotiator satisfaction following a negotiation (e.g., Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004), 
these results suggest that unfavorable relative outcomes prior to a negotiation influence negotiator 
behavior. 
We find that envy promotes deception in two ways. First, envy increases the psychological 
benefits from using deception by inducing schadenfreude, Second, envy lowers the perceived 
costs of deceiving by facilitating belittling and self justification. This cost-benefit framework is 
consistent with Lewicki’s model of deception (Lewicki 1983; Lewicki et el., 2003), which 
postulates that individuals make unethical decisions by weighing the perceived benefits and 
perceived costs of engaging in unethical acts. 
Results from our study also offer insight into the mechanics of envy. Notably, they 
demonstrate that envy in an organizational context is easily aroused. In addition, while prior work 
has suggested that perceptions of unfairness are an important part of feeling envy, our results 
suggest that perceived unfairness is not necessary for envy to operate. 
STUDY 2 
                                                 
1 We conducted two additional hierarchical regression analyses, alternating the order of entering psychological 
benefits and costs as independent predictors of SINS (envy always included first). For reasons of simplicity we do not 
report results in detail. However, we note that both models replicated our above reported mediation analysis. 
Independent of their order in the model, both psychological costs and psychological benefits (schadenfreude) had 
significantly unique contributions to predicting intended deception.    
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In Study 2, we extended our investigation of the relationship between envy and deception. 
Rather than manipulating envy by describing discrete unfavorable outcomes from a competition, 
as in Study 1, we manipulated envy by providing general unfavorable social comparison 
information. In this study, we also used a behavioral measure of deception with monetary stakes.  
The primary dependent variable in this study was claims participants made within a 
negotiation context. We asked participants to make decisions as “Proposers” in a single-period 
Ultimatum game with an uncertain pie size. In a typical Ultimatum game, two people decide how 
to split a sum of money. A “Proposer” proposes a split of a sum of money, and a “Responder” can 
either accept or reject the proposed division. If the Responder rejects the division, both players 
receive no money. If the Responder accepts the division, both players receive the amounts 
indicated by the proposal (e.g., Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwartze, 1982; Thaler, 1988).   
In the uncertain pie size version of the Ultimatum game, Responders do not know the size 
of the initial sum of money (or “pie”). Instead, Responders learn about the amount they are 
offered and receive either no information or a limited amount of information about the initial sum 
(e.g., Croson, Boles & Murnighan, 2003; Straub & Murnighan, 1995).  
In our study, participants could lie about the size of the pie when making an offer to their 
counterpart (the Responder). We randomly assigned participants to one of two envy conditions by 
manipulating social comparison information. We tested the thesis that when people are paired 
with a highly successful counterpart they will be more likely to envy their counterpart and to lie to 
their counterpart than when they are paired with a moderately successful counterpart.  
 
Pilot Test of the Envy Manipulation 
Method 
Design  
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We first conducted a pilot study to gauge the effectiveness of our envy manipulation. We 
used a 2x2 between-subject design that included two envy conditions (high versus low) and two 
gender conditions (male versus female). Both male and female participants read about a same-
gender counterpart who was either highly successful or moderately successful. 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 46 participants, 30 males and 16 females. We recruited participants 
via poster advertisements at an Israeli university with an offer to pay participants 25 NIS 
(approximately $5 USD) for their participation. 
Procedure 
As participants arrived, an experimenter assigned each individual to one of two adjacent 
rooms. The experimenters made an effort to convince participants that two parallel sessions of the 
experiment would transpire. These efforts included the following: First, the experimental rooms 
were located next to each other so that participants could see other participants entering a 
neighboring room. Second, before the experiment began, the experimenters counted the number 
of participants several times, made short announcements apologizing for the slight delay and 
explained that before beginning the experiment it is essential for both rooms to have an equal 
number of participants. Third, at the start of the experiment, participants read and heard the 
experimenter read aloud the following instructions:  
You and another group of students, currently located in a classroom nearby, are about to 
participate in a career assessment study. You will be asked to write a short description of 
yourself (by answering a few focused questions) and to complete personality measures. 
After writing the description and completing the personality measures, you will be paired 
with someone from the other room. You will read their essay and assess their career 
prospects. 
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Participants then completed a short “background information” survey that asked 
participants several questions about their background, including demographic questions, questions 
about their academic performance, entrance examination scores, military experience (which is 
compulsive in Israel), and social life.  
Research assistants collected the completed surveys, presumably to exchange them with 
participants in the other classroom, and gave participants a personality survey that included items 
from various scales. This served as a filler task to allow experimenters time to prepare (outside of 
view) the next set of materials.  
After participants completed the filler task, research assistants distributed completed 
versions of the background information survey. During this stage of the experiment, participants 
were led to believe that they would receive answers to the background information survey 
provided by a fellow participant in the neighboring room. In fact, each participant received one of 
four versions of the background information survey. These versions were handwritten and pre-
populated to induce either high or low amounts of envy. We created the four versions from a 2x2 
design that matched each participant’s gender and included a description of either a high 
performer or an average performer.  
While participants completed the filler task (the personality questionnaires), experimenters 
outside the lab randomly assigned each participant to an envy condition, matched the gender of 
that participant, and tailored the induction materials by matching information for the age and 
academic major of the pre-populated counterpart’s background information. Through this 
matching process, each participant read a completed background information survey about 
someone who was identical to them in terms of gender, age, and academic major, but was either a 
high performer or an average performer. We matched participants along these demographic 
dimensions to increase the self-relevance of the comparison. 
 Consistent with the purported objective of the experiment, we asked participants to assess 
Envy and Deception 16
the future career success of their “partner". We then assessed their feelings of envy toward this 
partner. We adapted the four item envy measure we used in Study 1 to match the current context. 
In addition to the direct envy item, the measure included the following three items: “This student 
has a highly advantageous and desirable resume”; “I would very much like to have a resume 
similar to this student’s resume”, “The thought of her/his accomplishments makes me feel 
aggravated.”.  Cronbach’s α measure for these items was 0.80, and we consequently used their 
mean as an aggregated measure of envy.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and paid for participation. 
Experimenters explained the importance of initially concealing the true purpose of the study, and 
of using the different versions of the background information. Experimenters thanked participants 
and provided contact information to enable further inquiries about the experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
 We first conducted a factorial ANOVA on the mean envy score as a function of the envy 
condition and gender. Results from this ANOVA revealed that the envy manipulation was, as 
expected, effective. Feelings of envy were significantly higher in the high envy condition than 
they were in the low envy condition, 4.2 (sd=1.2) versus 2.5 (sd=0.8) respectively, F1,42=35.5, 
p<.0001, η2=0.46. We found no significant main or interaction effects for gender. On average, 
men reported envy at levels very similar to those of women, 3.36 (sd=1.3) versus 3.33 (sd=1.4) 
respectively, F1,42=0.25, p=.6, η2=.006. 
 In this pilot study, we identified a method for inducing feelings of envy toward a potential 
counterpart. Across both genders, we found that participants reported significantly higher 
amounts of envy after reading about a high achieving counterpart than they did after reading 
about a moderately successful counterpart.  
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Lab Experiment 
Method 
Design  
As in the pilot study, we used a 2x2 between-subject design that included two envy 
conditions (high versus low) and two gender conditions (male versus female).  
Participants  
We recruited 60 participants for an experiment in decision making via posters at an Israeli 
university. Participants were promised a base payment of 35 NIS (about $8) and an opportunity to 
earn more.  
Procedure  
Upon their arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of two adjacent rooms. As 
in the pilot study, experimenters made an effort to convey that participants in the two rooms 
would complete the experiment in parallel. In fact, the experimenters waited until both rooms had 
an equal number of participants, in this case 30. 
The experiment included two stages. In the first stage, participants were exposed to the 
envy manipulation we used in the pilot study. In the second, participants made ultimatum game 
decisions.  
Stage 1 – manipulation. Before beginning the actual experiment, participants were told 
that they and another group of participants, currently sitting in a different room, would participate 
in a study about interpersonal decision making. They were then told the following:  
Before we begin the actual experiment each of you will be asked to write a short 
description of yourself (by answering a few focused questions) and to complete a 
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personality measure questionnaire. After writing the description and completing the 
personality measure, you will be paired with someone from the other room and read 
his/her self-description. 
Participants then completed a background information survey. We used the same version 
of the personality survey as we used in the pilot study, and gave it to participants as a filler task to 
complete while experimenters outside the lab tailored the envy manipulation materials to match 
participants in terms of gender, age, and field of study. Each participant then read background 
information about their purported “counterpart.” Unlike the pilot study, participants in this 
experiment did not answer questions about their feelings of envy. We were concerned that 
including these questions might focus participants on their feelings of envy and make the true 
purpose the experiment apparent. 
Stage 2: Ultimatum game. After collecting the first set of materials, experimenters 
announced the beginning of the second stage of the experiment, and handed out a new set of 
instructions. In these instructions participants were told:  
In this research, we are studying interpersonal decision making between people with 
different levels of acquaintance. As a result, some of you will be matched with someone 
new that you do not know anything about, and some of you will be matched with the same 
person whose bio info you have just read. 
Participants were told that their personal instructions would inform them which condition  
they were in (known or unknown counterpart). The instructions also included the following 
detailed explanation of the rules of the game:   
One of you will be Player 1, and one of you will be Player 2. The two of you will make a 
decision about how to divide a sum of money. Player 1 will receive an amount of money 
and will make an offer to Player 2 about how to divide it. Player 2 will then decide 
whether to accept or to reject Player 1’s offer. If Player 2 accepts the offer, the money will 
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be split between the two of you according to Player 1’s proposal. If Player 2 rejects the 
offer, neither of you will receive any money. You will be paid at the end of this experiment 
based upon the decisions you and your partner make.  
 In fact, all participants were assigned the role of Player 1 (i.e., Proposer), and all were 
informed that they were paired with a “known” counterpart, the counterpart whose description 
they had just read. Participants were also informed that while they know information about their 
counterpart, their counterpart does not know who they are or whether or not they are paired with 
the same person as before. We used these directions to provide participants with a sense of 
anonymity and to obfuscate the link between our envy induction and our measure of deception.  
Participants were informed that all Player 2 knows about the sum of money that Player 1 
has to divide is that the amount ranges between 10 NIS and 80 NIS, with any number within that 
range equally likely. Participants were told that they (as Player 1) will receive a note in a sealed 
envelope, indicating what the actual sum is (a number between 10 NIS and 80 NIS), and that upon 
receiving this information they will be asked to send an offer to Player 2 that includes: (a) Giving 
Player 2 information about the sum of money to be divided; (b) Making an offer to Player 2. 
Before receiving information about the pie size and making decisions, participants were 
given comprehension-check questions to assess their understanding of their role, their treatment 
condition (with whom they were paired), the rules of the game, and their notion of the research 
purpose.  
Experimenters then gave each participant 3 envelopes. The first included a note specifying 
the actual sum of money to be divided. In all cases, participants were given the same amount, 60 
NIS (about $14 USD). The second envelope included a form that asked participants to provide 
their counterpart with information about the size of the pie. The third envelope included a form 
that asked participants to specify their offer. Participants filled out the forms from the second and 
third envelopes, sealed the envelopes, and handed them to the experimenter. To give participants 
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a sense that the true sum of money they had to divide was private information, we instructed 
participants to keep the first envelope (that indicated the true pie size) until the conclusion of the 
study. We told participants that at the conclusion of the experiment they would return the first 
envelope to a separate experimenter who would pay them based upon their offer, their 
counterpart’s response, and the true pie size. Participants then completed a few final 
comprehension-check questions.  
We added a final stage merely to complete the ultimatum game and determine payments. 
In this stage, participants in both groups were told that they would play a second ultimatum game 
in a different role. We told participants in advance that only one of the participants in this second 
game would be randomly selected and anonymously paid according to the outcome of this game. 
We used the Player 2 decisions from this stage to calculate payments for the first game. 
We then debriefed participants, explained the importance of initially concealing the true 
purpose of the experiment and of using the manipulated background information surveys, and 
provided contact information for any further inquiries. Finally, we paid each participant in 
private. By design, during the payment stage, experimenters did not know whether the participant 
had or had not lied about the pie size (they only knew the pie size, the amount offered, and 
whether or not the offer was accepted). 
Results 
 Of the 60 initial participants, we had to exclude four who failed the comprehension checks 
and three who were not students. When completing the background information surveys, the three 
non-students raised their hands and asked how to complete the questions that were irrelevant to 
them (e.g., about their studies). Unfortunately, these participants were not only unable to 
complete the background information materials, but were also unable to receive the matching 
envy induction. As a result, we report results for the 53 remaining participants: 26 in the low envy 
condition (14 male and 12 female) and 27 in the high envy condition (14 male and 13 female).  
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 In this study, we did not ask participants to complete questions about their feelings of 
envy. We were concerned that asking these questions might make the envy manipulation salient 
and highlight the purpose of the study. Notably, in response to open-ended questions about the 
objectives of the study, no participants identified any issues related to envy. 
To test our thesis that participants would deceive high achieving (envied) counterparts 
more than they would deceive average (non-envied) counterparts, we examined deception 
regarding the size of the pie. For each participant, we measured the difference between the actual 
pie size (amount of 60) and the claimed pie size (the amount the participant reported s/he 
received). We performed a factorial ANOVA with gender and condition as between-subject 
independent variables and magnitude of deception as dependent variable. We depict these results 
in Figure 3. Supporting our thesis, we found a significant main effect for condition (F1,49=4.02, 
p<.05, η2=.08); the magnitude of deception in the high envy condition was significantly larger 
than in the low envy condition (15.4, sd=15 versus 7.8, sd=11 respectively). We found no 
significant main or interaction effects for gender (p’s > .3). In subsequent analyses, we collapsed 
data across the gender conditions. 
The difference in deception across envy conditions could be due to differences in the 
percentage of participants who engaged in deception, differences in the magnitude of deception 
(i.e., the extent to which participants who did engage in deception misrepresented the pie size), or 
both. To explore these differences, we conducted two sets of analyses. First, we compared the 
proportion of participants who lied about the pie size across the envy conditions. A greater 
percentage of participants lied about the pie size in the high envy condition than in the low envy 
condition, 61.5% versus 33.3%, Chi-square(1)=4.23, p<.05. Second, for participants that did lie, 
we compared the magnitude by which they lied. Across conditions, participants who used 
deception, lied by similar amounts. The 10 participants in the low envy condition misrepresented 
the pie size by an average of 20.2 (sd=9.2), and the 18 participants in the high envy condition 
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misrepresented the pie size by an average of 23 (sd=13); t26<1. Taken together, we found that 
envy increased the likelihood that participants would lie, rather that the magnitude by which they 
lied. 
We next examined the relationship between the use of deception and the amount 
participants offered. We conducted a factorial ANOVA for the amount participants offered as a 
function of the condition (low versus high envy) and whether or not they engaged in deception 
(did lie versus did not lie). We found a significant effect for engaging in deception (F1,49=18.45, 
p<.0001, η2=.27), but no significant main or interaction effects for condition (p’s>.8). Across 
conditions, participants who lied about the pie size offered significantly less than did participants 
who did not lie, 19.0 (sd=7.2) versus 27.1, (sd=5.2), respectively.  
Study 2 Discussion 
In the present study, we induced envy by providing participants with general unfavorable 
social comparison information. In our pilot study, we found that these comparisons significantly 
influenced feelings of envy. In our main study, we used monetary stakes and found that these 
unfavorable social comparisons prompted individuals to engage in deception.  
This study extends our investigation in two important ways. First, we demonstrate that 
envy can trigger deception behavior in a negotiation context. Second, we show that envy can be 
triggered by merely providing individuals with general background information about a 
counterpart that triggers an unfavorable social comparison. 
In our study, we found that envy promoted deception by increasing the likelihood that 
participants would engage in deception, rather than by increasing the magnitude by which 
participants lied. That is, while participants were more likely to lie to a high achiever than they 
were to a moderate achiever, deceivers across both conditions lied by similar amounts. This lack 
of a difference in deception amount, however, may be an artifact of our methods. The range of 
Envy and Deception 23
values, 10 to 80, was common information, and participants were constrained by the extent to 
which they could credibly misrepresent the pie size. 
Across conditions, participants offered about half of the claimed pie size. Participants who 
lied about the pie size offered 45% of their claimed pie size, while participants who did not lie 
about the pie size offered 48%. The similarity in offers is also likely an artifact of our methods. 
Prior work has found that in ultimatum games people generally offer the focal amount of 50% of 
the pie (Guth et al., 1982; Roth, Prasnikar, Zamir, & Okuno-Fujiwara, 1991; Thaler, 1988). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this work, we describe the influence of envy on the use of deception in interpersonal 
settings such as negotiations. We find that envy increases not only self-reported intentions to use 
deception, but also its actual use in an experiment with monetary stakes.   
Our findings add to the growing body of literature on the pervasive influence of emotions 
on judgments, decision making, and behavior (e.g.,  Forgas & George, 2001;  Guth, et al., 1982;  
Gneezy, 2004; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Allred et al., 1997). In the specific domain of 
negotiations, this research contributes by identifying a relatively under-studied discrete emotion, 
which results from unfavorable social comparisons and can have important impacts on negotiator 
behavior.  
Ultimately, our results have important implications for theoretical models of ethical 
decision making. Theoretical models of deception, including Lewicki’s (Lewicki, 1983; Lewicki 
et al., 2003) and others (e.g., Alingham & Sandmo, 1972; Jones, 1995; Jones & Ryan, 1997, 
2001; Trevino, 1986), have largely ignored the role of emotions as potential triggers of unethical 
behavior. Our results demonstrate that this is an important omission.  
Consistent with a cost-benefit framework of deception (e.g., Lewicki 1983; Lewicki et al., 
2003), we find that envy promotes the use of deception by both increasing its psychological 
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benefits, by inducing schadenfreude, and reducing its psychological costs by increasing belittling 
and assisting self justification.  
Across our studies, we found that envy is easy to induce. In our first study, we induced 
envy by describing a discrete unfavorable outcome from a workplace competition. We found that 
envy in this case did not require perceived violations of procedural fairness. In our second study, 
we induced envy by providing participants with general unfavorable social comparison 
information. Although our studies focused on the influence of envy with respect to negotiator 
behavior, people frequently experience both unfavorable outcomes and unfavorable social 
comparisons. As a result, envy driven deception may be triggered across, and have broad 
implications for, a wide range of social interactions. For example, although little research has 
considered workplace envy, we postulate that envy is likely to pose an important workplace 
problem (Mouly & Sankaran, 2002; Vecchio, 1995, 2000). In the workplace, formal competitive 
systems, such as performance reviews and promotions, as well as other social interactions, such as 
negotiations, are likely to cue social comparisons. When coworkers engage in upward social 
comparisons they are likely to experience envy. Prescriptively, several managerial actions might 
be worth considering in an attempt to curtail envy and its harmful consequences. Managers can, 
for example, modify their reward systems to make them less competitive. Our results suggest that 
increasing the likelihood that competitive reward systems will be viewed as fair may not be 
sufficient.   
Our research has additional prescriptive implications for issues related to impression 
management. Impression management characterizes efforts individuals undertake to influence 
how others’ perceive them. While prior work has assumed that impression management strategies 
such as highlighting one’s own out-performance are beneficial (e.g., Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & 
Riordan, 2002), our work demonstrates that such strategies can trigger harmful consequences by 
inducing envy. In fact, in many cases, individuals are likely to be well served by being modest 
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rather than self-promoting about their status and past good fortune. Future work should re-
examine impression management strategies and consider both the benefits and costs of impression 
management.  
In the specific context of negotiation, negotiators may be able to take a number of actions 
both to curtail envy and to limit envy’s harmful consequences. In some cases, past 
accomplishments are beneficial for negotiators. Specifically, if past achievements afford 
negotiators advantageous sources of power (e.g., positional power or referent power; Yukl & 
Falbe, 1991; Greenberg & Baron, 2003), they can negotiate more assertively and attain better 
outcomes (Mannix, 1993; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Thompson, 2001; Lewicki et al., 
2003). The present results suggest, however, that past successes may sometimes be a liability 
rather than an asset. We demonstrate an adverse consequence of past success, being envied. 
Consequently, while prior work suggests that negotiators should be modest about their surplus 
after completing a negotiation (e.g., Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004), results from this work 
suggest that individuals should be modest before and during a negotiation about issues unrelated 
to the negotiation itself. 
This issue is related to the construct of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is 
the capacity to perceive and be aware of emotions, assimilate emotion-related feelings, 
understand the information of these emotions, and manage emotions effectively (Mayer, Caruso 
& Salovey, 1999). As a result, emotional intelligence is likely to play an important role in the 
management and enactment of envy. From the envied person’s perspective, greater emotional 
intelligence may enable an individual to be less likely to trigger envy, more likely to detect envy, 
and more likely to diffuse or mitigate the harmful effects of envy. From the envious person's 
perspective, emotional intelligence is relevant for becoming aware of possessing this emotion and 
effectively managing its enactment in a way that might lessen its potentially harming 
consequences.   
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Limitations and future research 
Before concluding we note limitations inherent in the present work and suggest directions 
for future research. First, although in this research we provide initial insight into psychological 
processes that mediate the link between envy and deception, future work is warranted to further 
explore the mechanics of this relationship. Possible moderators of the envy-deception relationship 
include constructs such as perceived deservingness, self-esteem, and perceived self-competence. 
Prior work has found that negative attitudes toward high achievers occur more intensely when 
individuals believe that envied others do not deserve their rewards (e.g., Smith, 1991; Smith et al., 
1994; Feather & Sherman, 2002) and when individuals themselves have low rather than high self-
esteem (e.g., Feather, 1989, 1991). A related avenue for future research is the role of dispositional 
envy (Smith et al., 1999). Some individuals are prone to feeling envy more acutely than are 
others. In the present research, we did not examine or control for dispositional envy.  
Second, while in the present research we focused on the envious target, future work 
should also consider the perspective of the envied target. This work should for example 
investigate the extent to which people recognize that their accomplishments induce envy in 
others. Envy is a self-sanction emotion (Vecchio, 1995; Anderson, 1968; Silver and Sabini, 
1978), and many people who experience envy refrain from verbalizing their true feelings. As a 
result, individuals aiming to manage impressions or simply build credibility by highlighting their 
past successes may fail to recognize the envy they trigger in others and fail to anticipate its 
harmful consequences. In celebrating their past successes, people may ultimately make future 
success more elusive.  
Third, from a methodological point of view, in Study 1 we used a hypothetical scenario 
and in Study 2 we used anonymous counterparts in an ultimatum game. As a result, we need to be 
cautious about generalizing our results to real life negotiation situations where parties interact 
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beyond a single ultimatum offer, when identities are known, when long term relationships might 
be involved, and when stakes may be high. Our studies did not involve the social and long-term 
economic costs that deception in real life negotiations may entail. Notwithstanding, we maintain 
that because both envy and deception are socially undesirable, participants may have been 
reluctant to admit to feeling envy and engaging in deception in our studies. Hence, social 
desirability considerations of our participants may have resulted in underestimation rather than 
overestimation of their prevalence.  
Conclusion 
Results from this work describe the influence of envy on the decision to use deception. 
We find that people are more likely to lie to an envied counterpart than they are to lie to a non-
envied counterpart. These findings add to the growing body of literature on the pervasive 
influence of emotions in negotiations. In particular, they highlight the potential role of an 
understudied discrete emotion, envy, which is likely to be triggered in negotiation settings where 
social comparisons are common. Our results also have implications for theoretical models of 
ethical decision making. In particular, they point to the importance of attending to the role of 
emotions as potential antecedents of unethical behavior, which has largely been ignored.  
Since receiving unfavorable competition outcomes and unfavorable social comparison 
information are frequent experiences in many settings, we maintain that the envy driven deception 
we find in the domain of negotiations is likely to be facilitated across, and have implications for, a 
broad range of social interactions.  
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Figure 1: Study 1 – SINS score as a function of condition and gender 
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Figure 2: Study 1 –Mediating Analysis   
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Figure 3: Study 2 – Deception as a function of condition and gender 
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Table 1: Study 1 - Correlations between independent variables 
 
 
Envy Perceived Cost Perceived Benefit 
(Schadenfreude) 
Envy 
 
1   
Perceived Cost 
 
.29** 1  
Perceived Benefit 
(schadenfreude) .51** .56** 1 
 
**  = significant at p<0.01  
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Table 2: Study 1 – Results of a multiple regression for predicting SINS from envy, perceived 
costs and perceived benefits (schadenfreude) 
 
 
 Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Effect B Std. 
Error 
 Beta 
 
 
t 
 
 
P Tolerance VIF 
Constant 1.54 .18  8.50 .000   
Envy -.02 .04 -.05 -.6 .549 .74 1.35 
Perceived Cost .16 .08 .16 2.08 .039 .68 1.47 
Perceived Benefit 
(Schadenfreude)  
.37 .06 .50 5.82 .000 .55 1.81 
 
R: 0.59,  R Square: 0.344,  Adjusted R square: 0.33,  Standard error of estimate: 0.83 
 
Analysis Of Variance: 
Source             Sum-of-Squares    df        Mean-Square        F-ratio        P 
Regression          57.53          3          19.18                        28          0.000 
Residual 109.68          160       0.69                     
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Appendix 1 
 
Study 1 - Deception Measure (adapted SINS Scale) 
  
This questionnaire includes a list of tactics that negotiators sometimes use. For each tactic, please 
rate the likelihood that you would use it during your negotiations with Dan from “not at all likely” 
(score of 1) to “very likely” (score of 7). Circle a number. 
 
1. Promise that good things will happen to Dan if he gives you what you want, even if you know 
that you can’t (or won’t) deliver these things when his cooperation is obtained. 
 
2. Intentionally misrepresent information to Dan in order to strengthen your negotiation 
arguments or positions. 
 
3. Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle for. 
 
4. Convey a false impression that you are in absolutely no hurry to come to a negotiated 
agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on Dan to concede quickly. 
 
5. In return for concessions from Dan now, promise to make future concessions which you know 
you will not follow through on. 
 
6. Deny the validity of information which Dan has that weakens your negotiating position, even 
though that information is true and valid. 
 
7. Make an opening demand so extreme that it seriously undermines Dan’s confidence in his 
ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement. 
 
8. Guarantee that the rest of the managers and employees in your department, whom you 
represent in this negotiation, will uphold the settlement that you reach, although you know that 
they will likely violate the agreement later. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Study 1 -  Items included in the questionnaire for measuring potential mediating mechanisms 
 
 
The questionnaire included the following items with seven point scales:  
 
a) Perceived cost and justifiability of deception:  
(1) “It is justifiable for me to lie to Dan.” 
(2) “If I lied to Dan during our negotiation, it would bother me a lot                            
      afterward.” (r) 
  (3) “Dan is probably the type to only look out for himself.” 
  (4) “Dan is the type I would like to avoid spending time with if I can.” 
  (5) “I would bet that Dan has done some brownnosing at work.” 
 
b) Feelings of Shaden freude toward the other party – 3 items:  
  (1) “I want to compliment Dan on the work he has done.” (r) 
  (2) “I would really like to make Dan mad.” 
  (3) “Even if my outcome stayed the same, it would make me happy  
        if Dan did poorly in the negotiation.” 
 
